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(e) Any vague sort of reference to a hospital, clinical, or university
study guarantees that a product is reliable, and is probably preferable to
other, similar products (ads [1], and [13]).
In closing, it is worth reiterating that since food and drugs have the
potential of injuring health, instead of simply causing financial injury,
increased vigilance of food and drug advertising is justified. Consumers
have a right to be told more than they have been told about the
products they ingest.
BARRY S. DONNER

EXPUNGEMENT IN OHIO: ASSIMILATION INTO
SOCIETY FOR THE FORMER CRIMINAL
I. INTRODUCTION
within the last 50 years that there has been official
recognition of the debilitating legal and social consequences that result
from a citizen's arrest and conviction. Legally imposed restrictions and
the social stigma concomitant with a criminal record effectively operate
to penalize ex-convicts even after they have paid their "debt" to society.
A person with merely an arrest record suffers damage to reputation,
impeachment as a witness, disabilities in acquiring schooling and
professional licenses, more intense police scrutiny, and direct 2 economic
losses.' Consequences of a criminal conviction are more severe.
T HAS ONLY BEEN

Most criminal records are available to the general public; which
fact gives rise to many of the consequences attendant to conviction of a
crime. In recognition of this fact, several state legislatures have enacted
laws commonly termed "expungement statutes."' 3 These statutes seek to
go beyond mere sentence and imprisonment in dealing with the problem
of the criminal offender's relationship with society:
Expungement and annulment are the product of the recent emphasis
in corrections on rehabilitation. Both kinds of statutes are designed
to restore forfeited rights and uplift the offender's status by

I Menard v.

Mitchell, 420 F.2d 486, 490-91 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
examination is found in Gough, The Expungement of Adjudication
Records of Juvenile and Adult Offenders: A Problem of Status, 1966 WAH. U.L.Q.
147, 150-62 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Gough]. For an exhaustive study, see Special
Project-The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REv.
929 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Special Project].
3 The use of the word "expungement" to describe these statutes is somewhat of a
misnomer. To expunge "means to destroy or obliterate; it implies... a physical
2 A concise

annihilation." BLACK'S LAW DIcroNARY 693 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). None of the statutes

call for actual destruction of records.
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exonerating him from the fact of conviction and concealing the
conviction from public view. These statutes are unique because their
imposed by
primary objective is the elimination of the penalties
4
public opinion rather than those imposed by law.
Although the statutes manifest various approaches to the concept of
expungement (no two read exactly alike), they are all linked by the emphasis upon rehabilitation and the former offender's assimilation into society.
II. THE EXPUNGEMENT STATUTES IN GENERAL

Approximately 20 states now have expungement laws, the oldest and
most extensively interpreted being that of California. 5 The nature of the
relief afforded by the different statutes varies from withdrawing a plea
of guilty, or setting aside the verdict, 6 to expungement 7 and sealing of
records. 8 The former attempts to nullify the fact of conviction, while
the latter endeavors to hide all evidence of any proceedings against the
successful applicant. The typical expungement statute states in general
terms the effects of a grant of expungement, such as release from all
penalties and disabilities resulting from the conviction 9 and restoration of
all rights and privileges. 10 Most of the more recently enacted statutes
specifically provide that the successful petitioner for expungement may, in
applications for employment or licensing, state that he has never been
convicted of a crime." Almost all the expungement statutes, however,
permit the record of conviction of the expunged crime to be pleaded and
proved in a subsequent criminal prosecution.1
4 Special Project, supra note 2, at 1148-49. Confidentiality of juvenile criminal records
is and has been widely recognized; many states provide for expungement of such
records by statute. E.g., OHIO RaV. CODE ANN.

§ 2151.358 (Page Supp. 1973).

Juvenile expungement statutes, however, are not within the scope of this Comment.
5 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West Supp. 1974). A comparative reading of this and

the Ohio statute, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.31-.36 (Page Temp. Supp. 1973),
shows how differently expungement can be handled.
6 E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West Supp. 1974). Although statutes with such a
provision are commonly called "expungement statutes," they really are not. Gough,
supra note 2, at 152. These statutes are of more limited effect than true expungement
statutes, like that of Ohio. Id. Most existing court decisions about expungement
interpret statutes of this nature and, therefore, are not completely analogous to true

expungement statutes.

7 E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4617 (Supp. 1973).
8 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.45 (West Supp. 1974); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 295.32(C)
(Page Temp. Supp. 1973).
9 E.g., TEx. CODE CRI. PRO. ANN. tit. 42.12 § 7 (1966).
10 OHIo REV.CODE ANN. § 2953.33(A) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973).
1 E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4617(b) (Supp. 1973). Statutes with such a provision

state that the effect of the relief shall be that all criminal proceedings are deemed not
to have occurred. E.g., NEv. REV. STAT. § 179.285 (1971). See also MIcH. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 780.622 (1968), which merely provides that the proceedings are deemed
not to have occurred, making no mention of applications for employment. Where the
petitioner is released from all penalties and disabilities, such as in the California law,
there is never such a provision.
12
E.g., TEx. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. tit. 42.12 § 7 (1966); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §
2953.32(C) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973).
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The applicability of all statutes is limited either to probationers,1 3
convicts who have received pardons, 14 first offenders,' 5 or to those who
committed a crime before reaching the age of 21.16 Some laws combine the
requirements, and some add parolees to the list of those who are eligible."7
Some states make expungement the goal of rehabilitation and
require that the petitioner for expungement show that he has reformed
before he makes his application. He must have exhibited good moral
character since his conviction, or he must show that it is in the public
interest to grant the relief.' 8 Some statutes imply this by providing
that the court "may" grant the applicant's request.' 9 Others apparently
regard expungement as a method to accomplish or a way to encourage
after satisfactory
rehabilitation. They require that the relief be granted
20
completion of parole or probation, or upon pardon.

III.

THE Oao EXPUNGEMENT STATUTE

21

A. The FirstOflender
The availability of expungement in Ohio is limited to the first
offender,22 which the law defines as: "... anyone who has once been
convicted of an offense in this state or any other jurisdiction. When two
or more convictions result from or are connected with the same act, or
result from offenses committed at the same time, they shall be counted
as one conviction." 23 Unfortunately, this definition does not eradicate
all uncertainty.
The most salient uncertainty seems to be in regard to multiple
indictments and multiple counts of a single indictment. The statute makes
it clear that, if the offenses charged in the various counts or indictments
13-1744 (Supp. 1973).
15 § 2161-A (Supp. 1974).

13 E.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §
14 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.

15 E.g.,

Orno

REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.32(A) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973).

16 E.g., MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 780.621 (1968).
17 E.g., KAN.STAT. ANN. § 21-4617 (Supp. 1973).
18IDAHo CODE § 19-2604(1) (Supp. 1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4617 (Supp. 1973);
MIcH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 780.621 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 638.01 subdiv. 2
(Supp. 1974); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.32(C) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973);
UTAu CODE ANN. § 77-35-17 (1953).
19ARIz, REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1744 (Supp. 1973); NEV. REv. STAT. § 176.225 (1971);
N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:164-28 (1971); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12-53-18 (1960);
TEx.CODE CRIM. PRo. ANN. tit. 42.12 § 7 (1966); WA.s& REV. CODE ANN. § 9.95.240

(1961). See also Wyo. STAT. Am. § 7-315 (1957) (court has power in its discretion
to annul verdict or plea of guilty).
20DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4332(i) (Supp. 1974); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15
§ 2162-A (Supp. 1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 991c (Supp. 1974).
Z The Ohio expungement statute is contained in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.31-.36
(Page Temp. Supp. 1973). As originally introduced in the legislature the numbering
was § 2969.01-.05. This explains the apparently meaningless reference in present
§ 2953.35 to "Sections 2969.01 to 2969.05." (There is no Chapter 2969 in the present
Code). Through oversight the chapter and section numbers were not changed.
22
OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.32(A) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973).
23 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.31 (Page Temp. Supp. 1973).
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derive from a single act or from contemporaneous acts, there is still only
one conviction. However, convictions on multiple counts or indictments of
offenses that arise from non-contemporaneous actions are certainly not
uncommon, and the statute does not make it clear whether such conviction
would bar the offender from obtaining expungement of his records.
The question of the relationship between offenses and convictions, on
the one hand, and multiple counts and indictments, on the other, has been
examined by the courts chiefly in dealing with recidivist statutes.24 There
are two views on the matter. One is that separate indictments or counts are
separate offenses and that one convicted under separate indictments

comes within the reach of a habitual criminal statute.25 However, these
cases are narrow in their application, because they interpret specific
statutes and do not announce general principles of law.26
The majority view is that, "... . where there were two or more

convictions on as many indictments or on two or more counts in the
same indictment, only one of them may be subsequently utilized as
a previous conviction within the contemplation of habitual criminal
statutes.'" 7 It appears that the rationale for this view is that the
convictions should be sufficiently separated in time to give the offender

opportunity to reform.2 Rehabilitation cannot begin until the offender
has realized that he has committed a wrong and he fully understands
the gravity of his actions:

It is obviously the experience of the cold steel doors of the penitentiary slamming behind him or the inexorable conditions of probation,
restricting his movement and actions that effectively demonstrate the
futility of crime.... Apparently it is only when he has faced the total,
stark consequences that he should have learned his lesson.29

24 Since no court has yet interpreted the term "first offender" in the context of an
expungement statute, it is not illogical to rely upon and analogize with precedent in
the area of recidivists statutes. The terms "habitual criminal" and "first offender" are
semantically related. S. RuBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTIONS 465 (2d ed.
1973). Furthermore, recidivist and expungement statutes have their roots in the same
concept: rehabilitation. See text accompanying note 2 supra. Whereas expungement,
at least in Ohio, is available only to those who reform, recidivist statutes apply to
those who do not, or cannot, reform.
25 People v. Braswell, 103 Cal. App. 399, 407-08, 284 P. 709, 712-13 (1930); People
v. Carney, 203 Misc. 512, 103 N.Y.S.2d 75 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
26 E.g., People v. Braswell, 103 Cal. App. 399, 284 P. 709 (1930), was concerned
with a recidivist statute that was separated into two parts. One part explicitly stated
that prior convictions must be "separately brought and tried," while the other left out
the phrase. The court held that the omission must have been intentional and that
conviction of charges of different offenses tried concurrently would bring the offender
within the reach of the habitual criminal statute. Id. at 407-08, 284 P. at 712-13.
27 Annot., 24 A.LR.2d 1247, 1262 (1952).
2
8People v. Spellman, 136 Misc. 25, 29, 242 N.Y.S. 68, 71 (1930). See also People
v. Snow, 1 N.Y.2d 30, 133 N.E.2d 681, 150 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1956); Cromeans v. State,
160 Tex. Crim. 135, 268 S.W.2d 133 (195 4), which went so far as to hold that
convictions resulting in suspended sentences are disregarded in applying recidivist
statutes.
29

Moore v. Coiner, 303 F. Supp. 185, 191 (N.D. W. Va. 1969).
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Ohio case law is in accord with the majority view.30
The same reasoning that is used in dealing with recidivist statutes is
also valid as to an expungement statute, which also has its basis in
rehabilitation. In all justice, the offender should be given an opportunity
to meet the requirement of reformation, that opportunity coming after
the proceeding against him. Conviction of charges of separate offenses,
tried in the same proceeding, should be counted as only one conviction
3
so that the offender may earn a right to expungement of his records. '
B. The Court's Discretion
Section 2953.32(C) of the Ohio law states that expungement of
official records will be ordered, "[ilf the court finds that the applicant is a
first offender, that there is no criminal proceeding against him, that his
rehabilitation has been attained to the satisfaction of the court, and that
expungement of the record of his conviction is consistent with the public
interest ... .- 32 Thus, the court at nisi prius is given a certain amount
of discretion in' dealing with two of the criteria: the completeness of
rehabilitation and the determination that expungement of the individual's
records will be in the public interest.33 As is the case in other areas of
judicial discretionary powers, an appeal should be considered proper
because of the potential for abuse in the use of this discretion.M
In State v. Miller,35 the applicant for annulment had pleaded guilty
to a charge of burglary, but upon suspension of sentence he was placed on
probation. During the probationary period his fiancee became pregnant
and his probation was revoked. Miller served one year of the sentence and
thereafter married his fiancee, started his own business, bought a home,
and led a totally law-abiding life. The lower court denied his application
for annulment 6 on the evidence presented,3 7 even though there had been
3

oSee Carey v. State, 70 Ohio St. 121, 70 N.E. 955 (1904). The decision in Brumbaugh
v. State, 36 Ohio App. 375, 173 N.E. 267 (1930), should be distinguished because
there the defendant had pleaded guilty to two separate offenses at two different times.
The charges were consolidated only for judgment and journalization.
31 This also was the intent of at least one of the sponsors of the Ohio expungement
statute in the state legislature. Affidavit of State Senator (now U.S. Congressman)
Ronald Mottl, July, 1974, on file Akron Law Review.
32 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.32(C) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973).
33 Most expungement statutes endow the court with some amount of discretion.
34
People v. Johnson, 134 Cal. App. 2d 140, 142-43, 285 P.2d 74, 75-76 (1955); State
v. Schreiber, 121 Utah 653, 656, 245 P.2d 222, 223 (1952) (An order of expungement
is final and unconditional). See also GEORGETOWN LAW INsTrrTTE MODEL ANNU.MENT AN) SEALiNG STATUTE § 1, in AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, RaMovno OFFENDER
EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONs Appendix K (1972).
35

214 Kan. 538, 520 P.2d 1248 (1974).

36 The application for expungement was made under KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4616

(Supp. 1973), which applies to offenders who commit crimes before reaching the age
of 21. Much of the wording of that statute is identical to that of the Kansas adult
expungement law, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4617 (Supp. 1973), especially those parts
that relate to the effect Of an expungement order. Furthermore, the reasoning of the
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no showing of non-rehabilitation by the state other than the record of
his probation revocation. In a well-reasoned opinion, the Supreme Court
of Kansas reversed and said:
Judicial discretion must always be exercised within the bounds of
reason and justice. Judicial discretion is abused when it is arbitrary,
fanciful or unreasonable, where 38no reasonable man would take the
view adopted by the trial court.
The court then considered the evidence presented in the lower court:
The facts presented at the annulment hearing clearly demonstrated
that the defendant has made every conceivable effort to conform to
the norms and demands of our society.... There is no evidence
whatsoever in the record to show that the defendant has any
propensity toward continuing criminal conduct or that he is a clear
or present danger to the public. 39
Thus, in spite of the fact that a trial court's handling of a matter
ought to be given due respect, decisions which show a clear-cut abuse
of discretion need not be a total bar to relief for the reformed criminal
seeking expungement. 40 The Kansas court went so far as to spell out
a rule for judges to follow in the future:
We hold that the filing of a simple request with supporting evidence
to show compliance with the statutory requirements should constitute
prima facie entitlement to the annulment of a conviction. Annulment
of a conviction should be granted unless the court finds some strong
affirmative cause to deny it. In other words the norm should be
the granting of relief. . . unless the state shows some good compelling
reason not to grant it.41
Although this may conflict with strict interpretations of expungement, 42 it
is probably closer to the spirit of expungement's attempt to help replace
the former offender in society as a contributing member thereof.

Kansas Supreme Court is in general terms and is equally applicable to adult
expungement laws.
37 The district court also held the annulment law unconstitutional.
38 State v. Miller, 214 Kan. 538, 545, 520 P.2d 1248, 1254 (1974).
39 Id. at 546, 520 P.2d at 1255.
4
oHowever, there is no reason to believe that the court has any discretion in dealing
with the matter of the time at which an application for expungement may be brought.
See Anderson v. State, 512 P.2d 1387 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973), for an example of
strict, to-the-day compliance with time provisions in criminal proceedings. OHIO REv.
CoD ANN. § 2953.32(A) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973) expressly provides for a
three-year lapse for a felon and a one-year lapse for a misdemeanant. The court's
discretion is implied only in § 2953.32(C).
41 State v. Miller, 214 Kan. 538, 546, 520 P.2d 1248, 1254 (1974).
42
See Meyer v. Superior Court, 247 Cal. App. 2d 133, 55 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1966). See
also People v. Ignazio, 137 Cal. App. 2d 881, 290 P.2d 964 (1955) (in the absence of
some showing of fulfillment of conditions, there is a presumption that the applicant
did not fulfill them).
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C. The Handling of the Expunged Records
When the court determines that the requirements have been met to
its satisfaction, it orders all "official" records sealed. 43 "Official" records
should be distinguished from "public" records. The latter refers to "any
record required to be kept by any governmental unit." 44 More specifically,
public records would include:
Any document, device, or item, regardless of physical form or
characteristic, created or received by or coming under the jurisdiction
of any public office of the state or its political subdivisions which
serves to document the organization, functions, policies, decisions,
45
procedures, operations or other activities of the office ....
The term "official records," on the other hand, has a broader meaning
in that the term also includes those papers and documents made in
the normal course of the performance of a public official's duty."
Undoubtedly, this definition would also include copies of such papers and
documents. 47 However, matters of opinion contained in an official report
do not come under the definition."
Once it is determined which records are subject to a court order of
expungement, the official in charge of them must decide exactly how he is
to comply with the law. The Ohio statute merely provides for the sealing
of all records pertaining to the case and the deletion of all index
references. 49 There is no provision outlining procedure, nor is there even
a definition for the term "sealed." Therefore, the individual official has
50
been left to decide the procedure he deems appropriate.
A survey of several large Ohio counties 51 shows that the clerks of
court follow a fairly uniform procedure. To delete index references the
4

3

Oso REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.32(C) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973).

4Ono

REv. CODE ANN. § 149.43 (Page 1969).

45

Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 149.40 (Page 1969).
6State v. Black, 494 P.2d 1332, 1333 (Ariz. App. 1973). Thus, although a police
investigation report is not a public record, OP. OHIo ATr'Y GEN. 053 (1971), it would
be an official record and subject to sealing under the Ohio expungement statute.
47 See OP.Omo ATr'Y GEN. 034 (1973).
48 Carson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 156 Ohio St. 104, 104 N.E.2d 197 (1951).
49 Omo REv. CODE ANN.§ 2953.32(C) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973).
50 Although California and Nevada have adult expungement statutes that call for
sealing, no procedural hints are given. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.45' (West Supp.
1974); NEv. REv. STAT. § 179.245 (1971). The Ohio juvenile expungement law
supplies no clarification either. Osno REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.358 (Page Supp. 1973).
The only guidelines found are in a California Attorney General Opinion relating to
the California juvenile law. It states that name cards, master index cards, and other
such juvenile court records are to be removed from the files and either sealed with
other records on the individual or kept in a confidential master index. 40 OP. CAL.
4

ATr'Y

GEN.

50, as cited in CAL.

WELF. & INST'NS CODE

§ 781, Notes of Decisions

(West 1972).
51 Questionnaires were sent to the clerks of court of Cuyahoga, Hamilton, Montgomery, Franklin, Summit, Stark, Lucas, Mahoning and Trumbull counties. Cuyahoga,
Hamilton and Montgomery counties did not reply. The Mahoning County clerk
answered only that one application had been received in the year of the law's
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clerk strikes through the name with a black felt-tipped pen. He then places
all records and papers, including docket references, in a sealed file or
envelope. While a few offices place the old case number on the expunged
file, the clerk in one county assigns it a special number and maintains a
confidential expunged number index. Where the successful applicant for
expungement was one of several defendants in the original case, a special
problem arises since only the applicant's name can be removed from the
documents while some record of the individual's involvement must be
preserved in case he is ever arrested again. 52 In such instances, one clerk
reported that he retypes all papers, omitting the name of the applicant,
and places these in the regular files and dockets, while the original papers
are put in the applicant's expunged file. In every county, expunged files are
kept in a safe or other confidential space. If inquiry is made about
the individual by persons other than'those authorized by the statute,s the
clerks answer that they have no record.54
In general, other agencies follow a similar procedure.55 The Cuyahoga
County Sheriff's Office has devised a complete, well-conceived record
sealing method which might be a model for other agencies with similar
facilities. The original file jacket is removed from the Master Criminal File
and destroyed. All index cards, documents, entries, and all other references
to the applicant's arrest and incarceration are placed in a new file jacket
marked only with the appropriate sheriff's office number. The jacket's
cover tab is then taped shut in such a manner that will deface or tear the
file jacket if entry into the jacket is attempted. This sealed file is then
placed in the numerically proper location in the Master Criminal Files. An
ingenious device is used in the event the individual who has had his records
expunged is ever arrested again or if inquiry of any type is made. The
existence and that case was still pending. Apparently no procedure will be devised
there until the court issues an expungement order.
The questionnaires requested information about the clerks' procedures in sealing
their own records, their procedure in distributing an expungement order to other
agencies, and the number of applications that had been granted and denied in the
first year of the law's existence.
See Omo Ray. CoDE ANN. § 2953.32(D) and (E) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973).
Oio REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.32(D) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973) provides:
Inspections of the records included in the order may be made only by any law
enforcement officer, prosecuting attorney, city solicitor, or their assistants, for
the purposes of determining whether the nature and character of the offense
with which a person is to be charged would be affected by virtue of such person
having previously been convicted of a crime or upon application by the
person who is the subject of the records and only to such persons named in his
application.
54 One clerk, however, stated that the inquiring party is referred to the judge who
handled the case. This would seem to defeat the whole purpose of the expungement
law, because, if the inquiring party is referred to a judge, he knows that the
individual, at some time, must have been convicted of a crime.
55 Questionnaires were also sent to the sheriffs and prosecutors of Hamilton, Franklin,
and Cuyahoga counties. Only the sheriffs of Hamilton and Cuyahoga counties replied.
A special questionnaire was mailed to, but not returned by, the Ohio Bureau of
Criminal Identification and Investigation.
52
53

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol8/iss3/10

8

Wagner: Expungement in Ohio

AKON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8:3

Fingerprint Section of the sheriff's office maintains a fingerprint index that
refers to the expunged file's number. Thus, if the successful -applicant is
charged with another crime, new fingerprints are taken by the arresting
agency and will be referred to the sheriff's fingerprint index, which will
indicate whether there is an existing file on the person. In this manner
all inquiries must be accompanied by a set of original fingerprints.
Those agencies without such a sophisticated apparatus must employ
simpler methods 5 6 For example, one prosecutor's office simply marks
index cards and case files "Expunged" and places them in a special file
in the Administrative Assistant's office. One probation department merely
colored folders in order to
places expunged documents in distinctly
57
distinguish them from other files.
One prevalent criticism of expungement, as a means of hiding the
former criminal's conviction from the public view, has been that "criminal
records are located in so many different places that it is impractical to
' 8
fashion an order to expunge them all." This is a valid observation, and
its truth will surely hinder the effectiveness of any record-sealing statute.
In Ohio, sheriffs and police are required to take the fingerprints of
anyone arrested for a felony and forward them, along with other
description, to the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation
(B.C.I.).59 Courts, also, are required to send B.C.I. a weekly summary of
cases involving a felony or misdemeanor which becomes a felony on the
second offense. 60 The Superintendent of B.C.I., in turn, must cooperate
with bureaus in other states and with the F.B.I. to effect a complete
interstate, national, and international system of criminal identification.'
Private agencies and employers also keep records on persons in their
charge, and any criminal activity would probably be noted.
The record acquiring power of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is
more pervasive. Under federal law the Attorney General is required to
acquire, collect, classify and preserve criminal identification and other
6
records6 2 and to exchange them with state, local and federal officials. 3
The F.B.I. may obtain records not only from law enforcement agencies

56 See Gough, supra note 2, at 175 n.120.
57
Inter-Office Memo, Summit County Probation Department, Jan. 24, 1974.
58 Steele, A Suggested Legislative Device for Dealing with Abuses of Criminal
Records, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 32, 34 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Steele].
59
Omo REv. CoDE ANN.§ 109.60 (Page Supp. 1973). This applies even to those

arrested on suspicion of a felony. If the accused is exonerated, however, the
identification data must be returned to him on request.
0OHmo REv. CODE ANN.§ 109.57(A) (Page Supp. 1973).
61 O1o REv. CODE Am. § 109.62 (Page 1969).
6 28 U.S.C.A. § 534(a) (1) (1968).
6328 U.S.C.A. § 534(a) (2) (1968).
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but also from federal banks and all banks insured under FDIC.6 4 In 1970
alone, the F.B.I. processed 29,000 fingerprint cards daily.65
The problem of reaching the widely disseminated records is not easily
solved. The practice in most counties appears to be that, immediately after
an order of expungement is issued, the first duty of circulating the order
falls upon the clerk of courts. One county clerk sends copies of the
order, as a matter of course and without specific instructions from
the attorney or the court, to the county probation department, the city
police, the county sheriff, the arresting agency (if not the police or
sheriff), the F.B.I., the Ohio B.C.I., and the Ohio Bureau of Statistics.
The clerk of the municipal court also receives a copy if the case had been
bound over. Another county clerk also informs the county and/or city
prosecutor of the order. In those counties where the clerk has a list of
agencies which receive expungement orders as a matter of course, the
clerks will also send to any other person or agency named in the court's
journal entry. In those counties it therefore should be the responsibility
of the applicant's attorney to ensure that all appropriate agencies are
included in the expungement order. In fact, in two of the counties
surveyed, Trumbull and Franklin, the attorney must notify all agencies,
the clerk takes no part in the distribution process. 66 The list of agencies
set out above would likely suffice in most cases; however, notification
to private agencies and anyone else known to have any record of the
67
first offender's former criminal activity would be desirable.
In addition to the clerk and the applicant's attorney, other agencies
sometimes endeavor to aid in the dissemination of the expungement
order. The Cuyahoga and Hamilton county sheriffs send copies of the
order to all agencies or governmental bodies to which they may have
formerly supplied information regarding the individual. This is a wise
policy, since, in the sophisticated computerized system of record keeping
that exists today, it is difficult at best for the attorney to ascertain all
those entities that have records on the individual. The procedure of the
Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation is not known,
but even if it did endeavor to notify all its distributees, much of it would
68
be meaningless effort.
6428 C.F.R. § 0.85(b) (1974).
65 Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The text of the opinion
contains an extensive discussion of F.B.I. record-keeping procedure.
66 As a California writer and lawyer has suggested, certified copies of the order would
probably be most prudent. Booth, The Expungement Myth, 38 Los ANGELES B.
ASS'N BULL. 161, 163 n.15 (1962).
67 For example, it is likely that the local credit bureau would have some notation in
their files. It is doubtful, however, that an order to expunge records would be
enforceable against a private enterprise. But see Atchison, T. and S.F. Ry. Co. v.
Lopez .......
Kan .......
531 P.2d 455 (1975).
68 A state court judgment "... .restricting the use of criminal records would not extend

beyond the state boundaries." Steele, supra note 58, at 37. This is yet another fact
that makes expungement a less than totally effective means of hiding a former
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The F.B.I., although not required to do so, will remove from its files
and return identification data to the contributing agency upon request.A6
The Summit County Clerk of Courts reports that the F.B.I. returns all
data when it receives the expungement order, the F.B.I. apparently
construing the order as a request for return of records.
In summary, if expungement is to achieve its purpose, all available
means should be employed to conceal records. This is undoubtedly a
70
More
painstaking process and may be rather futile in some cases.
legislative guidance as to procedure and more court supervision of
compliance with its dictates would go far in correcting these defects.7
Perhaps even reciprocity agreements with
eliminate some expungement loopholes.
D.

other

states

would help

The PracticalEflect of Expungement

Of prime concern to the former criminal himself will be the practical
benefits that he receives from expungement. Renewed opportunity for
employment or professional licensing is likely to be the major, if not
sole, reason for turning to the remedy. Ability to serve on a jury or
as a member of a public board or qualification to run for office are
criminal's records from public view.
California's counterpart to B.C.I. is required by statute, however, to notify all
its distributees of a juvenile expungement order. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11105.5 (West
1970).
69

Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1974). As the court noted, 6,000
such requests were honored in 1970.
7
0 Supra note 68 and accompanying text.
7

1 See

GEORGETOWN

LAW

INsTITUTE

MODEL ANNULMENT

AND

SEALING

STATUTrE,

supra note 34, § 4. The Ohio law does not require agencies to inform the court of
compliance with the expungement order, but the survey reveals that some agencies
do so in the course of normal procedure.
The Ohio legislature did attempt to put force behind the law by making it a
fourth degree misdemeanor to knowingly supply unauthorized persons with expunged
data. OHno RLv. CODE ANN. § 2953.35 (Page Temp. Supp. 1973). Laws providing a
penalty for disclosure of confidential matter are not uncommon, but reported cases
of actual imposition of such penalties are virtually non-existent, Daniel Ellsberg being
a well-known example.
There may be a civil remedy in damages against the indiscreet public employee
who discloses confidential criminal records. The concept of privacy has been the
basis for a growing number of equity cases where the courts, without statutory
authorization, have ordered expungement of arrest records in the case of arrestees
who were discharged before trial or whose constitutional rights were violated in the
arrest. E.g., State v. Pinkney, 33 Ohio Misc. 183, 290 N.E.2d 923 (1972); Eddy
v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334, 487 P.2d 211 (1971); Annot. 46 A.L.IR3d 900 (1972).
Dean Prosser gives a most complete analysis of the civil action in tort for invasion of
privacy. W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 802 (4th ed. 1972). The

former criminal, whose expunged records have been illegally disclosed, might well
consider an action against the appropriate official on the basis of Prosser's classifications of Intrusion or Public Disclosure of Private Facts. Id. at 807, 809. Valuable
rights, such as the right to keep private personal records and documents, have been
recognized as appropriate grounds for equitable relief against public officials. Frey
v. Dixon, 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 58 A.2d 86 (1948) (dictum). Furthermore, in the light
of Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), the fact that defendants in such a civil
action for damages are public officials would not necessarily be a bar to the tort suit.
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factors which do not have such a broad effect on the ex-convict's life
but which may nevertheless be important to him.
Covering the practical effect, the Ohio expungement law is general
at one point:
An order of expungement of the record of conviction restores the
person subject thereof to all rights and privileges not otherwise
restored by termination of sentence or probation or by final release
on parole.73
At another point it is more specific:
In any application for employment, license or other privilege, any
appearance as a witness or any other inquiry... a person may be
questioned only with respect to convictions not expunged, unless the
question bears a direct and substantial relationship to the position
for which the person is being considered. 3
These provisions are also susceptible to differing interpretations. Whether
they will be interpreted broadly, so that an ex-convict is truly no longer
an ex-convict, or narrowly, with many loopholes and exceptions, will be
of utmost significance to those first offenders who opt for expungement.
1. Employment
Most private employers show great hesitation in hiring former
criminals. Some flatly reject them, and most will not hire them if there
are other applicants without criminal records. In addition, even if the
ex-convict does find a job, he is usually relegated to menial, unskilled
labor.7 4 Restrictions on public employment may be even greater.75
An inevitable question on any application for employment is whether
the applicant has ever been convicted of a crime.78 Although the Ohio
statute does not specifically authorize a negative answer,' the applicant
whose records have been expunged would probably be safe in replying
"No." Although authority in some states is to the effect that employers
can use expunged convictions in considering an application78 and,
72
73

§ 2953.33(A) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973).
OmO REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.33 (B) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973).
Oio Rnv. CODE ANN.

74 Special Project, supra note 2, at 1001-02.
75 Id. at 1013-18.
7
6 Even here, however, employers are being restricted. For example, HAwAn REv.
STAT. § 21-378 (Supp. 1973), prohibits employer discrimination on the basis of past
criminal records and California has recently enacted a law whereby employers are
prohibited from asking questions regarding criminal records on initial employment
applications. CAL. LABOR CODE § 4327 (West Supp. 1975).
7 Some statutes expressly provide that the petitioner may reply that he has never been
convicted. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4617 (Supp. 1973). But see MoDEL PENAL
CoDE § 306.6(3)(f) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
78 Taylor v. Macy, 252 F. Supp. 1021 (S.D. Cal. 1966) (even though the state has
forgiven the petitioner, the acts continue to exist); Op. TEx. ATr'y GEN. No. M-640
(1970), as cited in T97. CODE Calm. PRO. ANN. tit. 42.12 § 7 Notes to Decisions
(Supp. 1974) (the former criminal may not conceal an expunged conviction from
prospective employers).
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therefore, by implication, may require the applicant to reveal prior
convictions, the reasoning of these authorities probably is based on the
79
narrow relief afforded by their respective expungement statutes. In
Ohio, "the proceedings shall be deemed not to have occurred. ... "80 By
answering negatively, the former offender would merely be accepting the
position that the law assumes. Furthermore, the enigmatic clause ".. . a
person may be questioned only with respect to convictions not expunged
.. " 81 also indicates that a negative answer is appropriate.
The negative answer might in many cases end inquiry into a
prospective employee's criminal past, but the diligent employer may still
82
learn of prior convictions in other ways. The applicant who has
answered in the negative may also be required to account for the period
that he was actually imprisoned. Explanations such as "self-employment"
or "extended vacation" will serve only to aggravate any suspicions an
8
employer may have. 3 Furthermore, it has been said that exceptions,
84
such as those in the Ohio law, to the strict confidentiality of records
open the door for employer access.
From a public policy and public interest standpoint, it may even be
8
unwise to conceal conviction from all employers. Professor Gough has
listed some areas where the nature of the job virtually requires exclusion
of certain prior offenders: a former embezzler with a bank; a former sex
offender as a teacher; any previous offender as a policeman or in a
80
position involving high national security and defense. These areas are
undoubtedly what the legislature intended to affect with the insertion
of the clause ".. . unless the question bears a direct and substantial
relationship to the position for which the person is being considered."'
TOIn both California and Texas a plea or verdict of guilty is merely set aside. CAL.
42.12 § 7 (1966).
PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West 1970); Tax. CODE Clum. PRo. ANN.tit.

See note 6 supra.
80
OHio REv.CODE ANN. § 2953.32(C) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973).
81 OHio REv.CODE ANN. § 2953.33(B) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973).
82 Lack of enforcement of prohibition of access and required waivers of confidentiality giving the employer the authority he needs to gain access to records are two such
means. 1970 WASH. U.L.Q. 530, 531-32 n8 (1970). Also, a question on an employment
application, such as, "Have you ever been convicted of a crime that has been
expunged?" should not be permitted as a circumvention of the purpose of the statute.
83AmaE.IcAN BAR ASS'N, REMovINo OFFENDER EMPLOYMENT REsTRicTIoNs 7 (1972).

84 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.32(D) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973).

85 Steele, supra note 58, at 40.
88 Gough, supra note 2, at 182-83.
87 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.33(B) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973). This part of the statute presents some serious difficulties. For example, the question arises as to who is to
determine whether the conviction bears a substantial relationship to the position
sought. Surely it cannot be left to the former criminal himself, who would obviously
be prejudiced in his own favor. Resting the decision on the employer seems absurd,
because, if the applicant states that he has never been convicted and if the records are
truly effectively sealed from the public view, the employer will never learn of the
expunged record to make the determination. Perhaps statutory guidance is necessary.
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Such arguments under the uncertain delineations of public policy are
difficult to refute. They do ignore the very tenet of Ohio's expungement:
rehabilitation. "To rehabilitate means to restore to one's former rank,
privilege or status, to clear the character of reputation or stain, to retrieve
forfeited trust and confidence." 8 Thus, expungement, being a result of
rehabilitation, places the former criminal in his status quo ante. 9 For
expungement to do so, it assumes that the one-time criminal no longer has
the criminal character, and, if this assumption is true, a former embezzler
should be considered as qualified as anyone else to work in a bank. 90
2. Licensing
Ohio, like other states, regulates the legal ability to pursue certain
occupations by licensing. 91 Statutes dictate the qualifications which one must
have to be granted a license and outline the grounds upon which one may
have his license revoked or suspended. To become a C.P.A. or a licensed
architect, for example, one must be of "good moral character." 92 A physician's license may be suspended for conviction of a felony,93 and no one
convicted of a felony of moral turpitude may be a real estate broker.9 4
Conviction of a felony is ground for revocation of almost all licenses. 9
The effect of expungement on the applicability of a first offender's
conviction to the licensing laws is not clear. The exception contained
in Section 2953.33(B), discussed above as to employment; did not
appear in the expungement bill as it was originally introduced in the
legislature. But its addition during the enactment process indicates
there will be at least some situations in which the expunged conviction
will be considered by licensing boards. It remains to be determined
which situations, 96 but until such a determination is made, the former
criminal will not be guaranteed that expungement will open the door
to all licensed professions.97

8

89

In re Stoller, 160 Fla. 769 ...... 36 So. 2d 443, 444 45 (1948).
State v. Miller, 214 Kan. 538, 544, 520 P.2d 1248, 1253 (1974). See also United

States v. MacLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 749 (5th Cir. 1967).

90

Needless to say, though, a judicial determination of rehabilitation would not impress

the parent who is faced with the prospect of having a one-time child molester in the
same classroom with his own children.
91 OHio RaV. CODE ANN. § 4701.01-4751.99 (Page 1954 and Supp. 1973).
92 Omo Rsv. CODE ANN. § 4701.06(D) (Page Supp. 1973); Osno REv. CODE ANN. §
4703.07 (Page Supp. 1973).
9

3 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22 (Page Supp. 1973).
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4735.07(B) (Page Supp. 1973).
95 E.g., OHIo Rav. CODE ANN. § 4701.16(E) (Page Supp. 1973).
94

96 Undoubtedly public policy will be an important consideration in the interpretation

of the statute and its effect upon licensing. See notes 84-86 and accompanying text
supra.
97

California has enacted specific provisions to several of its licensing statutes
regarding the effect of expungement. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10177 (West
1970) (real estate licenses).
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The possibility exists that expungement will have no effect in the area
of licensing. It might be argued that the licensing boards can inquire
about any conviction, whether expunged or not, because any occupation
important enough to be licensed and regulated by the legislature would
fall within the exception which allows inquiry concerning expunged
convictions which have a direct relationship to the position sought.
Arguably any conviction has a direct relationship to an occupation
important enough to be regulated by the state.
Although licensing boards are not permitted to be totally arbitrary
in reviewing license applications,98 they have been accorded broad powers
and discretion. In Papatheodoro v. Department of Liquor Control," the
court held that restoration of rights and privileges upon termination of
sentence or discharge from parole does not erase the effect of a licensing
statute's provision that no person convicted of a felony may obtain a liquor
license and that, therefore, the licensing board must deny the application
°
on the basis of the conviction.10 A license is not a property right, and
11
the state may validly deny its issuance. License laws,
... are police regulations designed to promote the general welfare
and protect the public morals. They were enacted in the interest of
public health and safety and their object is not to punish.... It is
essential to distinguish the nature of the statute in question from the
nature of our criminal statutes which are punitive in their nature.
The legislative will of the people of Ohio has been expressed in the
Liquor Control Act .... Here there is a fair, just and reasonable connec2
tion between the statute in question and the common good of society.10
California case law, following the same general reasoning as the
Papatheodoro decision, is uniform as to the effect of expungement on
licensing statutes. Expungement is a criminal remedy, while licensing is
civil in nature 03 Objection is raised to judicial determination of
rehabilitation, and, for the purposes of licensing, such determination does
4
not have to be recognized.' 0 In view of the "high degree of professional
skill and fidelity to the public it [licensed occupations] serves," licensing
boards must be allowed their own discretion in deciding whether a former
0
5
criminal has rehabilitated sufficiently to assume such responsibilities
The narrowness of the provisions of the California expungement law

98Schware v. Board of Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Miller v. Board of Appeals

and Review, 294 A.2d 365 (D.C. App. 1972).
99 118 N.E.2d 713 (Ohio C.P. 1954).
1oo Id. at 717.
11 Id. at 715.
1ald. at 716.
103 Copeland v. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 241 Cal. App. 2d 186, 50 Cal.
Rptr. 452 (1966) (release from penalties and disabilities means release from criminal
penalties and disabilities).
104 Stephens v. Toomey, 51 Cal. 2d 864, 338 P.2d 182 (1959).
105 Id. at 872, 338 P.2d at 186.
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as to its practical effect1 08 should not be overlooked in analogizing the
California decisions to the Ohio statute. Mere release from penalties and
disabilities resulting from the Coniction 107 would necessarily be of less
effect than restoration of all rights and privileges not otherwise restored
by termination of sentence or final release on parole.10 8 The latter clause
also distinguishes Ohio's expungement statute from the statute under
consideration in the Papatheodorocase.
A 1949 Ohio Attorney General Opinion19 presents more analogous
reasoning. There a convicted felon had served in World War II and had
thereby come under a postwar Presidential proclamation pardoning all
convicts who had served in the armed services during the war. He applied
for a liquor license, and the Department of Liquor Control requested the
opinion of the Attorney General as to the effect of the pardon on the
licensing statute which prohibited former felons from obtaining a liquor
license. The Attorney General opined that a Presidential or Governor's
pardon totally relieves the person pardoned from licensing disabilities:
It [a pardon], in legal contemplation, obliterates the offense, giving
him a new credit and capacity, and rehabilitating him to his former
position in society. It is said to make of the convict a new man, and
to be, in effect, a reversal of the judgment, a verdict of acquittal,
and a judgment of discharge thereon, to this extent, that there is
a complete estoppel of
record against further punishment pursuant
n0
to such a conviction
This language is virtually identical to that which has been used to describe
the general effects of an order of expungement, 11' and the reasoning of
the Attorney General as to pardoned convicts vis-A-vis licensing statutes
seems equally applicable to the former criminal who has had his
conviction expunged.
Thus, there are two forces at odds in the area of licensing and
expungement: the police power of the state and its interest in assuring
that only the highest caliber of persons practice certain professions, versus
the state's interest, as effectuated by the expungement law, of replacing the
deserving, reformed criminal to a useful position in society. The two
interests are not wholly incompatible if the ex-convict has truly reformed,
but the courts and the legislature have traditionally accorded much power
and importance to the licensing boards, and usurpation of such power by
expungement will most likely not be perfunctorily recognized.
3. Other Areas
The recently enacted Criminal Code provides that a person convicted
06

1

See note 6 supra.

107 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West Supp. 1970).
108 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.33(B) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973).
109 OP. OFHo Arr'Y GEN. 510 (1949).

l1OId. at 513 (quoting 30 0. Jur. § 17 [xxxxl).
U1

See notes 4, 87-8 8 and accompanying text supra.
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of a felony loses the right to be an elector, to be a juror, and to hold an
office of honor, trust, or profit.1 2 The convicted felon regains his
competency to vote upon final discharge and is restored all the rights and
privileges forfeited upon a full pardon?' 3 This wording may present a
problem for the ex-convict who wishes to hold a public office or serve on
a jury and who seeks expungement to remove his disabilities in these
areas.-1 4 The statute"m only states that upon pardon are the privileges
restored, and the expungement statute states that privileges returned are
those not otherwise restored by termination of sentence, probation, or
final release on parole." 6 The question which therefore arises is whether
the privileges restored by expungement include those privileges restored
only by pardon in Section 2961.01. Although the new Criminal Code and
the expungement statute became effective on the same date, the latter
statute was the first passed through the legislature. If chronology is
significant, it can be argued that the legislature intended to include in the
expungement law the restoration of the privileges restored only upon
pardon in Section 2961.01.1 7 However, it can also be argued that there
is a conflict between the two statutes, and, since Section 2961.01 is the
more specific, it must govern-' 8 In view of the positive remedial purposes
of the expungement law, the courts should attempt to construe it
liberally' 9 and in such a manner so that both laws are given effect.'"
Since Section 2961.01 does not say that restoration of the ability to be
a juror or hold public office occurs only with a pardon, consistent
construction is not impossible.
The Ohio Constitution provides that ,no person convicted of
embezzlement of public funds shall hold any state office."' There is
authority to the effect that statutory expungement will not override
such a constitutional provision.'22
Expungement would probably eliminate the necessity of registration
for the former sex offender.- A first offender who has had his record

-U Oso
'"
'Omo

REV. CODE ANN.

§ 2961.01 (Page Spec. Supp. 1973).

REv. CODE ANN. § 2961.01 (Page Spec. Supp. 1973).

IL4 See Matsen v. Kaiser, 74 Wash. 2d 231, 443 P.2d 843 (1968).
5Omo REv. CDE ANN. § 2961.01 (Page Spec. Supp. 1973).
IL6 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.33(B) (Page Temp. Supp. 1973).

117 There is also the argument of the close analogy between the practical effects of a
pardon and that of expungement. See notes 111-12 and accompanying text supra
11
8 See Omo RiEv. CDE ANN. § 1.51 (Page Supp. 1973).
119 OHIo REV. CDE ANN. § 1.11 (Page 1969).
20 Omo RLV. CoVa ANN. § 1.51 (Page Supp. 1973).

M O11o CONST. art. H § 5.
= Stephens v. Toomey, 51 Cal. 2d 864, 338 P.2d 182 (1959).
IMSee Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 349 P.2d 974, 3 Cal. Rptr. 158
(1960).
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sealed might be allowed to carry firearms,
not be impeached as a witness.Im

24

and apparently he could

It is open to question whether federal courts, in cases arising under
federal law, will recognize state expungement. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has consistently held that, for the
purposes of immigration and naturalization, Congress did not intend to
26
accept state expungement.1 Federal courts will most probably decide
basis, using judicial discretion and
individual
each case on an
interpretation of congressional intent.W27
IV. CONCLUSION

Expungement as a method of restoring the rehabilitated criminal to
his former status has been severely criticized: "Record concealment is
unworkable; it fails to lift other penalties attendant to the record;
it
it sanctions deceit; its half secrecy leads to speculative exaggerations; 128
frustrates constructive research; and it is not equally available to all."'
The statement may be true even with a strong, unequivocal law, but its
truth has greater inevitability with a weak, loophole-ridden statute. The
Ohio expungement statute is not unequivocal. Without authoritative
guidance, procedures for sealing have differed and vary from the careful
to the haphazard. Unless there is strict enforcement of the statutory
dictates, employers will still be able to learn of conviction records, and
unless there is a judicial turnabout or a more straightforward statute in
regard to licensing, expungement in Ohio will be of little help to the
first offender who applies for a professional license. It is evident that
more astute legislation is needed. At the very least, liberal court
interpretation, like the Miller decision, is an absolute necessity if Ohio
expungement is to approach the achievement of its purpose.

124Ohio law now allows a former felon to petition the court to relieve him of the
disability provided, inter alia, he has been law-abiding since his discharge.

CODE ANN. § 2923.14 (Page Spec. Supp. 1973).
(Page Temp.
.ZOHIoREv. ConEANN .§2953.33(B)

Supp. 1973).

OHIO

REv.

However, the

wording of § 2953.32(E) does not make it clear whether that provision applies only
to criminal proceedings in which the former criminal is himself a defendant or to all
criminal proceedings. If the latter, then he could be impeached at any criminal trial.
28

1

Brownrigg v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 356 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1966);

Garcia-Gonzales v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 344 F.2d 804 (9th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840 (1967).
127 See In re Ringalda, 48 F. Supp. 975 (S.D. Cal. 1943).

128 Kogan and Loughery, Sealing and Expungement of Criminal Records-The Big

Lie, 61 J.Cazls. L.C. & P.S. 378, 383 (1970).
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APPENDIX
A Lawyer's Expungement ProceduralOutline
I. Facts to be ascertained from the client.
A. The crime of which he was convicted.
Section 2953.36 provides that expungement will not apply where the crime
was one for which probation was unavailable or where the conviction is
under Chapters 4507, 4511, or 4549 of the Revised Code. This includes
crimes under those chapters as they are enumerated under the new Criminal
Code. Some crimes that were listed under those chapters in the old
Criminal Code have been inserted into Title 29 and therefore are not
excluded from expungement.
B. The year of his conviction and when parole, sentence, or probation terminated.
Section 2953.32(A) provides that three years must have passed since his final
discharge in the case of a felony, and one year in the case of a misdemeanor.
C. Whether there is any criminal proceeding presently against him.
Section 2953.32(C) provides that there must be no proceedings against him
at the time of the application.
D. Whether he has been convicted of any crimes since the first conviction.
Expungement is limited to first offenders.
E. The name and location of the sentencing court.
Section 2953.32(A) provides that the application shall be made to such court
if the conviction was in Ohio. If it was an out-of-state conviction, the
application may be made to any court of common pleas.
F. General facts about his personal life that would be persuasive to the court
of his rehabilitation.
Such facts might include the following:
1. Employment record;
2. Marital status and number of children;
3. Whether he is a home owner;
4. Community activities;
5. Interests and hobbies; and
6. Record on probation.
H. Filing with the court.
A. The form of the application.
Since the form differs from county to county, the attorney should ascertain
the procedure in the particular county in which he is filing. The application
should allege fulfillment of the conditions as enumerated in Section 2953.32(C)iB. A $50 filing fee is required, except for the indigent applicant.
C. The attorney should obtain a hearing date at the time of filing.
The court will notify the prosecutor of the hearing and may also have the
probation department make inquiries and a written report as to the merit
of the application.
III. When the order is granted.
A. The attorney must file a judgment entry for court approval to the effect that
expungement has been granted.
B. Depending on the practice of the county in which the granting court sits, the
attorney may have to list agencies to whom the order is to be sent. Some
counties require that separate Instructions to the Clerk be filed. The text
contains a discussion of agencies that should receive a copy in all cases;
whether other agencies should be sent a copy depends on the facts of the
client's history.
C. Agencies that receive the order are not required to report compliance with
it. However, the conscientious attorney might take it upon himself, after a
period of time, to inquire of the agencies as to whether they have sealed
their records.
JAEs 'L.WAGNER
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